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brought pollution and population decline to
others. Despite the many negative impacts oil
development has had in Ecuador, the government
has decided to facilitate an increase in production
through the construction of a second pipeline,
allowing for a greater volume of oil to be
expOlted. This article will examine the potential
impacts of the construction of the new pipeljne,
the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (O.c.P), by a
Oil production in Ecuador has been
something of a mixed blessing. While bringing
economic benefits to some groups, it has
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consortium of multinational oil companies. It
will begin with a blief discussion of Ecuador
and its oil industry. It will then discuss the
pipeline consortium, and the social and
environmental concerns associated with the
project. A brief discussion of transnational
alliances and their significance in the processes
of resistance to the pipeline will conclude this
article. Its purpose is to discuss the
contradictions of economic development for
Ecuador, and to illustrate the different kinds of
external pressures and/or support brought to
bear on vmious EcuadOIian social actors.
Ecuador is a small country located on
the Western coast of South Ameli ca. It is
bordered to the north by Colombia, and to the
south and east by Peru. Geographically
speaking, the country is internally divided into
three areas: the coastal lowlands. the sierra or
the Andes. and the Oliente. or Amazon basin.
The rainforests of the Oliente occupy 13 million
hectares (Kimerling 1991:849) and are home to
some 350 000 to 500 000 indigenous peoples.
Government policy has consistently viewed the
Oliente as a frontier land. to be explored and
conquered, tamed and exploited (Kimerling
1996:6). Despite its ecological fragility. the
Oriente has been the major site of oil
exploration and exploitation in Ecuador for the
last thilty years.
The Ecuadorian oil industry began in
1967 with the discovery of oil in the Oliente by
a Texaco-Gulf consortium (Kimerling
1991 :857). The government and the consortium
collaborated to ensure the development of the
oil industry. In the early 1970s. EC.\lador·s
revenue rose dramatically due to large amounts
of oil exports, and high world prices associated
with the oil crisis and the O.P.EC embargo
(Philip 1982:280). However. by the mid-1970s.
there was a fall in world oil prices. Conflicts
between multinationals. and an increasingly
nationalistic oil policy (Conaghan 1988: 109).
including the formation of the state oil
company, decreased Ecuador's oil exports.
After the return to democracy in the late 1970s.
governments undertook policy changes that
modified the tax code to attract multinational
investment, which allowed for further
development of the industry. The state oil
company, PetroEcuador, currently o\\'ns and
operates the existing pipeline. knO\m as
S.O.T.E (Sistema Oleoducto TransEcuatoriana).
The Amazon has been divided on paper into
areas known as concession blocks. \\'hich arc
auctioned off periodically to multinational oil
companies, who explore and drill for the oil. They
then pay PetroEcuador a transpOit fee for the use
of the pipeline (Toronto Environment Alliance
2002) to transpOit their product from the Lago
Agrio terminal in the Amazon, over the Andes, to
the port of Esmeraldas, where the refinery is
located. The oil industry has provided many
benefits to Ecuador's economy; indeed, it is
perhaps the country's most important export
product by value. However. the industry has also
brought many hardships to the people and the
ecosystem of the Amazon.
Setting up operations for oil production
is inunensely damaging to fragile ecosystems.
Exploration requires the creation of seismic grids
and access roads; production demands wells,
waste pits, and pumping stations. To illustrate the
impacts of oil production in the region, I will
relate to you the effects of Texaco' s operations in
the Amazon from 1967 to 1992. Texaco was
responsible for the construction of the terminal at
Lago Agrio. as well as S.O.T.E. They provided
minimal resources for maintenance of the pipeline
and for cleanup. When a rupture occurred. it
could take days for the affected section to empty
itself, due to the spacing of shut-off valves
(Kimerling 1991 :872). Spills from the pipeline
during Texaco' s control totalled 16.8 million
gallons (Switkes 1994:7) - 1.5 times the amount
spilled from the Exxon Valdez. Texaco was also
responsible for the construction of production
facilities, including wells. Their first well was
located in the hem1 of Cofin territory
(www.texacorainforesLcom). When Texaco
pulled out of operations in 1992. they left behind
1000 uncovered waste pits. 20 million gallons of
toxic wastewater. and 4 millions barrels of
drilling mud (Switkes 1994:7). The environmental
impacts of Texaco' s operations directly affected
the health status of the Cofin people. who were
reduced in number from 3000 to some 300
individuals. These circumstances are not unique
to Texaco - almost every other oil operation has
had similar impacts on the people and the
environment. Thus. it is apparent that Ecuador's
history with oil has heen a mixed blessing -
economically it has generated substantial
revenues for the state. hut it has had high social
and environmental costs.
Despite these costs. the decision was
made to construct a second pipeline and increase
(in fact. almost double) national oil production.
The Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados will also
transpOit oil 503 km from Lago Agrio, over the
Andes, to Esmeraldas. The O.c.P. consortium is
headed by the Canadian company Encana. and
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also includes Spain' s Repsol- YPF, Argentina' s
Perez Companc and Techint, Amelica' s
Occidental, and Italy" s AGIP (Toronto
Environment Alliance 2002). Two major factors
underlie the decision to constluct this second
pipeline. As previously mentioned,
multinationals producing oil in the Amazon
must cunently pay a fee to Petro Ecuador in
order to transp0l1 the oil to the coast for export.
The companies building the pipeline will own
and operate it for the next 20 years, and thus
will not have to pay transport fees. Possible
losses to the state were to be offset by the 500
000 jobs the construction process was to create.
Given that the population of Ecuador is
approximately 13.5 million, this was a
considerable inducement. As it tums out, very
few of those promised jobs have materialised;
most have gone to foreign specialists rather than
EcuadOlian workers (Drost 2002). However, at
the time, the decision to build a new pipeline
seemed beneficial for all. The second major
factor in the decision was an LM.F. loan to
Ecuador in the year 2000. Conditions of that
loan required the govemment to increase oil
production (Drost 2002). This is consistent with
IMF goals to increase exports, even non-
renewable exports, to generate foreign cunency
for debt repayment. As the northem blocks of
the Amazon were already being exploited,
largely to capacity, the only way for the
govemment to meet the terms of the loan was to
open the southem Amazon to oil production. It
should be noted that the oil of the southem
Amazon is of a different quality than that of the
north. It is a heavier grade of crm;le. S.O.T.E is
not capable of transporting that grade of oil. As
a result, a second pipeline was needed.
Financing for the pipeline was secured
from a consortium of intemational banks, led by
Westdeutshe Landesbank of Dusseldorf
(WestLB). The financial consortium insisted
that the O.CP. consOltium comply with World
Bank Group social and environmental safeguard
policies (Goodland 4). Thus, the consortium
ananged for an Environmental Impact
Assessment (E.LA) to identify possible risks in
the construction process, to assist with the route
selection, and to suggest possible means of
mitigating disruptions to peoples' lives in the
construction process. This assessment was
completed in June 2001. Most recently, the
consortium has set aside a $16 million
"EcoFund" (Drost 2002) to be distlibuted to the
people through local NGOs. On the surface, the
O.CP. consortium appears to be making an
attempt to avoid the environmental and social
problems of the past. However, things are not
always as they seem. A number of social and
environmental problems have come to the
forefront since constlUction began - problems
which have spuned both local and intemational
protest.
The first major problem is with the route
selected for the O.CP. The pipeline runs parallel
to S.O.T.E in the Amazon, then branches off in
the Andes, crossing north of Quito, and rejoins
S.O.T.E in the coastal lowlands, continuing on to
Esmeraldas. This branch in the Andes is called
the "northem route"; the S.O.T.E route is the
"southem route". The selected route for the O.CP
requires the pipeline to pass through 20 "medium
to large sized municipalities" (Goodland
2002: 12), indigenous territories (Toronto
Environment Alliance 2002), as well as the
Mindo-Nambillo Nature Reserve. This region is
home to some 40 endangered bird species, 275
types of orchids, many butterflies, and other rare
flora and fauna (Wyss 2001:1). The area is part of
the Choc-Andean Corridor project, a biodiversity
protected area funded by the Global Environment
Facility (Goodland 2002: 15). Additionally, the
majority of the citizens of Mindo are employed in
the ecotourism industry - an industry severely
threatened by the construction of the pipeline
through the cloud forest. This northem route is
substantially higher in biodiversity than the
southem route, raising some questions about the
selection process. It tums out that the northem
route was selected in 1999, more than one year
BEFORE the E.LA was completed (Goodland
2002: 10). How exactly then was the route
selected? Not all relevant documents are available
in the public domain, but there is some
speculation that economic reasons factored into
the choice - it is estimated that the northem route
costs $80 million less than all other altemative
routes (Drost 2002). The route for the new
pipeline thus appears to have been selected on an
economic basis, rather than with full
consideration of the social and environmental
implications of running a pipeline through a
seismically active area with 94 fault lines
(Toronto Environment Alliance 2002), through 20
odd municipalities, and through a Global
Environment Facility protected area.
A second major area of contention is
with the claim that the consortium is complying
with certain World Bank Group (W.B.G.)
standards. Dr. Robert Goodland, a tropical
ecologist who authored many of those W.B.G.
standards, was hired by a coalition of German,
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American, and Italian trade unions to perform
an independent assessment of the O.c.P.
consOltium's level of compliance (Goodland
2002:6). Dr. Goodland's repOlt was released in
September 2002, and is quite damaging. The
consortium fails to comply with 4 major
W.B.G. social and environmental safeguards.
The previously mentioned problems with the
route selection, combined with an apparent lack
of independent environmental assessment, and
the failure to assess regional and sectoral
impacts of the project, indicate that the
consortium fails to comply with O.P. 4.0 I, the
Policy on Environmental Assessment.
Additionally, the consortium fails to comply
with O.P. 4.04 by not protecting 'critical
habitats' - including the Mindo reserve. as well
as several other designated 'protected areas'.
The EIA does not include a resettlement plan
for affected peoples - a violation of W.B.G.
O.P. 4.12. Finally, the EIA fails to consider the
effects of the project on ethnic minorities -
particularly the Afro Ecuadorians of the coastal
area. This is in violation of O.D. 4.2. Thus, the
O.c.P. consortium is NOT in compliance with
several key World Bank Group policies, as they
have claimed to be (perhaps in order to retain
their financing ... ).
The final area of contention is at the
basis of the construction process. The goal
behind the construction is to increase
production and expOlt heavy crude. This means
that the multinationals involved will need to
explore and drill for oil in previously
unexploited areas of the Amazon rainforest.
Indeed, the very construction of the_O.C.P. has
already resulted in the auctioning of a further
2.4 million ha of rainforest to multinationals
(Goodland 2002:6). The effects of oil
exploration in the Amazon, as previously
addressed in the discussion of the Texaco case,
have been very well documented in the past.
Numerous studies have been published
outlining the social and environmental impacts
of oil production in the rainforest. Aside from
the direct effects of pollution. the access roads
built in the construction process also contribute
to environmental and social damage; they allow
for the migration of colonists into the rainforest.
These colonists then contribute to further
deforestation and encroach on Indian lands.
Admittedly, it is possible that the corporations
who are successful in their bids for concession
blocks may not perpetrate the social and
environmental abuses of the past. Activism in
the Amazon has increased in the past three
decades, making the indigenous federations of the
Amazon forces to be reckoned with. However,
given the irresponsible behaviour of the
consortium members in the route selection
process, the probable impacts of increased
production are a concern. Additionally, there is
the high probability that the benefits the pipeline
will bring to the Ecuadorian state have been
exaggerated. The state will not receive control of
the pipeline for 20 years. Many estimates indicate
that, in 20 years, the oil reserves of the Amazon
will be entirely depleted (Drost 2002). The state
would therefore receive minimal economic
benefit from the construction of the pipeline, and
the economy would remain dependent on an
unsustainable form of development.
These factors surrounding the
construction and potential impacts of the O.c.P.
pipeline have spUlTed a great deal of national and
international protest. Local protest has arisen in
the Amazon from the indigenous federations
(local. regional, and the national federation), from
Ecuadorian environmental groups such as Acci6n
Ecologica, and from communities along the
pipeline route who are directly affected by the
construction, such as the Mindo-Nambillo
community. Transnational alliances have also
developed to coordinate the international protest
against construction of the pipeline. These allies
include various environmental and human rights
groups, such as Birdlife International and the
Toronto Environment Alliance, who have
coordinated international efforts to protest the
construction of the pipeline. Originally, the
strategies revolved around preventing the
construction of the pipeline. Indeed, as recently as
last September, effOlts were made in Germany to
cut off funding for the pipeline (Drost 2002).
WestLB. the major partner in the financing
consortium, is primarily owned by the German
government, making its citizens the primary
shareholders. When it became apparent, with the
release of the Goodland report, that the O.c.P.
consortium was NOT upholding the conditions of
the loan (i.e.: compliance with World Bank
standards), a massive protest ensued. WestLB,
however, has recently declined to call in the loan.
This was essentially the final effort aimed at
protesting the construction process, as the
pipeline is now well over 80% completed.
International strategy has now switched to
mitigating the impacts of the pipeline, and of the
associated future oil development, within
Ecuador.
Oil development in Ecuador has long
been a contradictory process of economic
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development. While bringing much needed
revenue to the state, it has fostered a type of
dependence on a non-renewable resource, and
has caused a great deal of environmental
damage. It is also not simply a regional or
national process. International actors, including
the IMF. the World Bank, multinational
corporations, and activist groups are all heavily
involved in the process of development,
bringing different pressures and supports to bear
on local actors. The I.M.F., for instance,
imposes financial pressures that push for the
further development of the oil industry.
Multinational corporations do the same, through
the power of foreign investment. Activist
groups engage in resistance to development
through their support of local actors, as well as
through international protest campaigns (aimed
both at Ecuadorian and international players).
This article has illustrated some of the
contradictions of oil development, and revealed
how it is an arena in which the interactions of
local and global actors can be explored.
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